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Something Scary Is Happening In Biolabs - Annie Jacobsen
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Key Moments
Genetically engineered bioweapons, like a super-plague, could cause near-extinction and societal collapse, and current defenses and government plans are insufficient to protect the public.
Key Insights
Biological warfare is considered the most likely existential risk and a close second to nuclear war in destructiveness, with genetically modified weapons designed to evade existing vaccines and countermeasures now existing.
Unlike nuclear war, where the response is total annihilation, biological war planning focuses on government continuity, not broad population protection, leaving the general public vulnerable.
The origins of gene editing date back to 1971 with Paul Berg's creation of recombinant DNA, a foundational technology for bioengineering that has dual-use potential for healing and harm.
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed profound global unpreparedness for a pandemic and a significant fracturing of public trust in science and institutions, hindering potential responses to future outbreaks.
Engineered pandemics pose a 1 in 30 risk in the next 100 years, far higher than natural pandemics (1 in 10,000), nuclear war (1 in 1,000), or climate change (1 in 1,000), according to Toby Ord's risk chart.
The number of high-containment BSL-4 and BSL-3 laboratories in the US dramatically increased after 9/11, from two BSL-4 labs to fifteen, and over a thousand BSL-3 labs, raising concerns about accidental leaks and research into dangerous pathogens.
Biological war: a silent, self-replicating threat poised to surpass nuclear fears
Biological warfare is presented as an equally, if not more, frightening prospect than nuclear war, not because of immediate annihilation, but due to its insidious and prolonged suffering. While nuclear war is a singular event, biological war, enabled by living, self-replicating pathogens, offers a stealthier, more pervasive threat. This invisibility and silence make it particularly sinister. A key distinction from nuclear war is the potential for a warning window of 12-36 hours, during which preventative measures could theoretically be taken, though this window is critically small. Despite being illegal, genetically modified biological weapons with extreme transmission, hypervirulence, and vaccine-evading capabilities are a present-day reality. The core danger lies in pathogens being 'living munitions' that replicate autonomously once released, making them a uniquely unpredictable and potentially unstoppable force.
The government plans for survival, but not for you
A stark contrast is drawn between responses to nuclear and biological threats. While former FEMA director Craig Fugate stated there is no plan for population protection in a strategic nuclear attack, citing that everyone would be dead, a distinct plan exists for biological war. However, this plan is not for the general population but for a select group of government officials, offering them a means to survive the incident or attack. This 'continuity of government' plan, known as devolution, highlights a significant disparity in preparedness and survival strategy, leaving the public entirely unprotected. This 'super creepy' reality, as described by the author, underscores a critical failure in societal defense that people should be aware of and extremely concerned about.
The birth of gene editing and the dual-use dilemma
The foundation of modern biotechnology, and subsequently bioweapons, was laid in 1971 with Nobel laureate Paul Berg's work at Stanford University. Berg pioneered the creation of 'chimera pathogens' by developing recombinant DNA technology, essentially the origin of gene editing. This ability to recombine genetic material, while revolutionary for medical advancements, inherently possesses a dual-use problem. Like fire, which can cook food or burn down a village, gene-editing technology can be used for healing or for harm. The argument for its development, particularly in the context of dangerous pathogens, is to create medical countermeasures. However, this defense-oriented research often involves 'gain of function' research—genetically modifying pathogens to give them new, enhanced capabilities—which critics argue is a euphemism for biological weapons engineering, creating a dangerous catch-22.
COVID-19: a costly lesson in unpreparedness and distrust
The COVID-19 pandemic served as a harsh and potent lesson on global unpreparedness, despite billions spent on pandemic preparedness. The two most critical takeaways were the stark realization of how ill-equipped the world was and the profound erosion of public trust in science, public health officials, and governments. This fracturing of trust is seen as incredibly dangerous and a primary obstacle to effective responses in the future. The pandemic's impact is likened to a 'vaccine gone wrong' or a 'poison of the mind,' which, while offering lessons on super-spreader events, masking, and inherent inadequacies, also critically damaged the public's willingness to heed expert advice. The potential for future pandemics to be met with widespread pushback due to this eroded trust is a significant concern.
Engineered pandemics: the most probable catastrophic risk
Toby Ord's 'precipice risk chart' starkly illustrates the elevated threat posed by engineered pandemics. While natural risks like asteroids and naturally arising pandemics are presented with lower probabilities, engineered pandemics carry a 1 in 30 chance within the next 100 years. This is significantly higher than nuclear war (1 in 1,000) and climate change (1 in 1,000). The distinction between global catastrophic risks and existential risks is crucial: existential risks imply permanent, unrecoverable collapse. While nuclear war is considered an existential risk, recovery might be possible for civilization. However, a highly transmissible and lethal engineered bioweapon could achieve a 'permanent unrecoverable collapse' by incapacitating every individual indiscriminately. The scenario of a weaponized plague with a 100% case fatality rate, designed to evade cures and inflict mass death, represents this terrifying possibility.
The Soviet Union's 'Manhattan Project' for bioweapons
The Soviet Union's vast and secretive biological weapons program, dubbed their 'Manhattan Project,' is highlighted as a crucial historical development. After President Nixon renounced America's biological weapons program in 1969 and the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty was signed globally, the Soviets allegedly stole US recombinant DNA technology in the 1970s. They then pursued an ambitious program to develop a 'super plague weapon.' While the extent of their success at the time is debated, the program's scale and intent—to cripple America by killing its population while leaving infrastructure intact—were profoundly disturbing. Today, the State Department officially states that Russia and North Korea possess robust biological weapons programs, while China and Iran are deemed questionable, suggesting the threat is ongoing.
The paradox of biodefense: more labs, more risk
A significant conundrum exists in biodefense: the effort to defend against biological attacks leads to the construction of more high-containment laboratories (BSL-4 and BSL-3). This proliferation of labs, both domestically and globally, paradoxically increases the opportunity for biological catastrophe through accidental leaks or deliberate attacks. Post-9/11, the number of BSL-4 labs in the US surged from two to fifteen, with over a thousand BSL-3 labs. While BSL-4 labs handle no-known-cure pathogens like Ebola, BSL-3 labs work with agents like plague and hantavirus. The very research aimed at creating countermeasures can inadvertently advance the engineering of bioweapons, especially when 'gain of function' research is conducted within these facilities.
Elements of the perfect biological weapon and their horrifying potential
The characteristics of an ideal biological weapon are terrifyingly clear: airborne transmission and 100% transmissibility, meaning even casual contact could lead to infection. Virulence, or case fatality rate, is another critical factor. While COVID-19 had a 1% fatality rate, a genetically modified pneumonic plague could have a 100% fatality rate, especially if engineered to evade antibiotics. The incubation period is also crucial; a short incubation (1-3 days) combined with engineered euphoria, as theorized in Soviet research, could maximize spread before individuals realize they are sick. Furthermore, the possibility of creating synthetic pathogens or 'chimeras' from scratch using advanced techniques like CRISPR and AI opens up terrifying avenues for novel biological threats, many of which are highly classified due to their potential weaponization.
The breakdown of trust and the specter of anarchy
A core theme emerging from biological warfare scenarios is the complete erosion of trust, which is fundamental to societal functioning. In such a crisis, citizens would not trust the government, armed forces might question their allegiances, and individuals would view each other as potential threats. This breakdown makes coordinated response impossible and fosters widespread anarchy and insurrection. The COVID-19 pandemic, with its 1% fatality rate, did not push the US to the brink of anarchy, as many did not personally know anyone who died. However, a pathogen with a 30% or 100% fatality rate would be a completely different scenario. The government's plan focuses on protecting critical infrastructure and maintaining continuity of government, not on the public, further exacerbating the lack of trust. Ultimately, those who survive are likely to be military personnel with continuous protection and ruthlessly pragmatic individuals willing to do 'inhuman things'.
Devolution: the government's ultimate survival plan
In the face of widespread chaos and collapse, the US government has a classified plan known as 'devolution' or 'continuity of government' (COGCON). This plan designates a select group of individuals who are pre-chosen to survive and maintain governmental functions. These individuals, aware of their roles and possessing 'go bags,' would relocate to secure facilities, the locations of which are highly classified Special Access Programs (SAPs). The process involves transitioning authority and resources to these designated survivors to ensure the government's continuity even if the general population succumbs. This elaborate and secret plan highlights the government's preparedness for worst-case scenarios, underscoring the potential severity of biological threats and the stark reality of survival planning that excludes the vast majority of the populace.
The strategic national stockpile: a potential flashpoint for anarchy
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a classified reserve of medical countermeasures like vaccines and antibiotics, is crucial in pandemic scenarios. While its existence is public, its locations are secret for security reasons. In a catastrophic outbreak, the potential discovery of SNS locations by desperate citizens seeking life-saving supplies could trigger widespread anarchy, as these facilities would likely be overrun. The government's plan involves deploying '12-hour push packages' from these caches to cities. However, the realization that these resources are vital for survival, coupled with the public’s distrust of government deployment and the sheer scarcity of essential medical supplies, creates a potent recipe for civil unrest and conflict over the stockpile. The sheer number of firearms in the US (estimated at 500 million) further amplifies the risk of armed conflict during such an event.
Technology outpaces wisdom, necessitating awareness and prevention
Science and technology, particularly in biotechnology and AI, have advanced to a point where they far outpace conventional wisdom, even outpacing the Defense Department's ability to control or fully comprehend their applications. The democratization of information and technology, while beneficial in many ways, also lowers the barrier to entry for creating dangerous technologies. This is likened to drawing balls from an urn: each technological advancement (a ball) could be beneficial, risky, or catastrophic. The concern is that as we continue to draw balls, we might eventually draw a 'black ball' that signifies an 'game over' scenario. The author emphasizes that the purpose of her book is not to incite panic but to foster prevention and awareness. Understanding the limitations of public health officials and embracing uncertainty are crucial first steps, rather than pretending to possess definitive knowledge and suffering the fallout of fractured public trust.
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WMD Threat Spectrum & Existential Risk Chances (Next 100 Years)
Data extracted from this episode
| Risk Type | Chance of Occurrence |
|---|---|
| Asteroid, Comet, Supervolcano, Stellar Explosion (Natural) | 1 in 10,000 |
| Nuclear War | 1 in 1,000 |
| Climate Change | 1 in 1,000 |
| Other Environmental Damage | 1 in 1,000 |
| Naturally Arising Pandemics | 1 in 10,000 |
| Engineered Pandemics | 1 in 30 |
| Unaligned Artificial Intelligence | 1 in 10 |
| Unforeseen Anthropogenic Risks (Unknown Unknowns) | 1 in 30 |
| Total Anthropogenic Risk | 1 in 6 |
Pathogen Case Fatality Rates
Data extracted from this episode
| Pathogen | Case Fatality Rate |
|---|---|
| COVID-19 | 1% |
| Hantavirus | 30% (High) |
| Seasonal Flu | 0.1% |
| Pneumonic Plague | 100% (without antibiotics within 24 hours) |
| Polio | 1% (of carriers develop symptoms) |
Common Questions
While nuclear war is seen as a sudden, catastrophic event with no population protection plan in the US, biological war often receives less public attention despite being considered more likely and dangerous. There is a plan for biological war, but it's primarily for government officials, not the general population.
Topics
Mentioned in this video
Nobel laureate who figured out how to create chimera pathogens and recombinant DNA in 1971, marking the origin of gene editing.
Author of 'The Precipice', which charts catastrophic and existential risks, including pandemics and AI.
A top-level White House advisor who discussed pathogens with the speaker that can self-replicate.
A philosopher from the Future of Humanity Institute, known for an experiment illustrating the risks of readily available destructive technology, and the most cited philosopher under 50 in the world.
Former FEMA director under Obama, who informed the speaker about the lack of population protection plans in nuclear war but a government-only protection plan for biological war, and the concept of 'devolution'.
Former Senate Majority Leader, who was a target of the anthrax attack after 9/11 and described biological warfare as a 'deeply nightmarish' event that would lead to the 'death of government' and cause people to do 'inhuman things just to survive'.
An Italian notary and author of 'The Decameron', a book containing contemporary accounts of the Black Death.
Co-founder of OpenAI, who discussed with the speaker how ChatGPT was able to reveal classified information about strategic national stockpile locations.
A gene editing technology, described as third or fourth-generation, that allows for precise modification of genetic material.
A virus similar to smallpox, used in an Australian experiment to see if a vaccine could be defeated, which it was.
A strain of avian flu that was modified in a 2012 experiment to become airborne, demonstrating how an existing pathogen can be made more dangerous.
A deadly virus that usually has a very low chance of survival, and while a medical countermeasure (ZMapp) exists for some variants, new mutations (like in the Congo) can render it ineffective.
A classified US program that stores medical countermeasures like vaccines, antibiotics, and other supplies for emergencies; its existence is known but locations are secret.
A book written by Toby Ord that categorizes and quantifies various global catastrophic and existential risks, published in 2019.
A famous book by Giovanni Boccaccio, an Italian notary, that chronicles contemporary accounts of life during the Black Death, including tales of human nature under extreme duress.
A book written by the speaker about DARPA, published 10-11 years ago, noting DARPA's former leadership in technology.
Identifies Russia and North Korea as having robust biological weapons programs and views China and Iran's programs as questionable.
An institute focused on identifying and mitigating global catastrophic risks.
A BSL-4 facility in Koltsovo, Siberia, near Novosibirsk, where the majority of the Soviet Cold War biological weapons research took place. It experienced an explosion in 2019.
The National Security Agency, responsible for signal intelligence (SIGINT) to detect unusual activity.
The National Reconnaissance Office, responsible for space satellites (NRO is the eyes, NSA is the ears) in intelligence collection.
The Defense Department's only BSL-4 lab, where Dr. Henry Heim worked during the anthrax attacks.
A US force of 18,000 individuals trained to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, deployed to protect critical infrastructure during an outbreak.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, once considered the leader in technological advancement, but the speaker notes that civilian tech now often outpaces it.
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