How does Paul Draper's argument about the origin of consciousness relate to the argument from evil?

Draper contrasts two hypotheses: one where the physical world comes first, leading to consciousness, and another where purely immaterial persons (like God) exist first. He argues these are equally probable and, in the 'consciousness first' scenario, the existence of a perfectly good being is just one possibility among others (like an evil or indifferent being), thus reducing its probability.

What is the 'million marble argument' and why is it important?

It's an objection to the structure description principle in probability. It posits that if you draw a white marble from an urn, the principle predicts a 2/3 probability the next marble will be white, which most people find counterintuitive, suggesting the principle might be flawed.

What is the difference between structure descriptions and state descriptions in probability?

Structure descriptions only tell you how many individuals have a property (e.g., how many marbles are white), not which ones. State descriptions specify which individual objects have which properties (e.g., marble X1 is white, marble X2 is black).

What is the role of equiprobability principles in the argument from evil?

Equiprobability principles are crucial for assigning probabilities when there's no prior evidence. They assume that in the absence of specific information, different possibilities are equally likely. This is fundamental to assessing the probability of a perfectly good creator existing, given the extent of evil.

Why does Michael Tooley prefer the state description approach over the structure description approach?

Tooley finds the structure description approach's prediction of 2/3 probability in the million marble case implausible. He argues the state description approach, despite Carnap's initial concerns, aligns better with the intuition that we can learn from experience and yields a more plausible probability (slightly over 1/2).

Can the Bayesian approach be used for the argument from evil?

Yes, the Bayesian approach can be used, but it relies on underlying equiprobability principles for its initial probabilities. Some Bayesian approaches are subjectivist and skeptical of assigning probabilities without evidence, which contrasts with Tooley's more objective equiprobability stance.

What is Tooley's confidence level in the argument from evil?

Tooley states he is 'very very close to 100%' confident. He believes that all replies to the argument he has examined are defective and that the sheer amount of horrendous evil in the world makes the existence of a perfectly good being highly improbable.

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Why the Argument from Evil Depends on Probability | Michael Tooley

Closer To Truth

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Sep 2, 2026|3,870 views|39|35

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TL;DR

The existence of evil makes a perfectly good God mathematically improbable by presenting an infinite spectrum of possible divine beings, not just good or evil.

Key Insights

The argument from evil suggests that the vast amount of suffering in the world makes the existence of a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient God mathematically improbable, not impossible.

The core of the argument relies on equiprobability principles, which suggest that a vast range of possible supernatural beings, not just a perfectly good one, should be considered equally likely.

Paul Draper's initial argument focused on the hypothesis that any existing supernatural being is indifferent to good and evil, proposing this as more probable than theistic hypothesis.

The 'Million Marble Argument' challenges the structure description approach to probability, where sampling a white marble from an urn with a million marbles (999,999 white, 1 black) should yield a 2/3 probability for the next marble being white, a conclusion deemed implausible by most.

The state description principle, conversely, suggests a probability of 500,001 out of 1,000,001 for the next marble being white in the 'Million Marble Argument,' which is closer to intuitive probability.

The speaker, Michael Tooley, expresses high confidence (very close to 100%) in the argument from evil, stating that replies to it that he has examined appear defective.

The evidential argument from evil hinges on probability

The evidential argument from evil, as discussed by Michael Tooley, is a probabilistic argument that challenges the coherence of theistic beliefs in the face of pervasive suffering. Unlike deductive arguments, it doesn't claim the existence of evil logically proves God's non-existence. Instead, it posits that the amount and types of evil in the world make the existence of a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient God significantly less probable. This probabilistic stance, tracing back to David Hume's 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,' explores various hypotheses about the creator's nature – perfectly good, perfectly evil, or indifferent – and argues that the evidence of evil weighs against the traditional theistic conception. The contemporary philosopher Paul Draper's work is highlighted as a key representation of these arguments, initially focusing on the hypothesis of divine indifference.

An infinite spectrum of possible beings undermines divine goodness

A central tenet of the argument is the concept of equiprobability principles, which suggest that when faced with a range of possibilities about which we have no specific evidence, we should assign them equal probability. Tooley argues that this principle, when applied to the nature of a supernatural being, leads to a dramatic reduction in the probability of a perfectly good God. Instead of a simple dichotomy of good or evil, an infinite spectrum of possible beings exists, each with different dispositions towards good and evil. For example, one could conceive of beings disposed to do good 0.1% of the time, 0.2% of the time, and so on, up to 0.9%, with a perfectly good being at 1.0 and a perfectly evil one at 0.0. If all these infinite intermediate possibilities are considered equally probable, then the probability of the single point representing 'perfectly good' approaches zero.

Challenging inference to the best explanation

Tooley expresses skepticism about 'inference to the best explanation' (IBE) as a primary method for these arguments. He notes that IBE often involves balancing competing criteria like simplicity and explanatory power, which can be subjective and lead to arbitrary choices. Instead, he advocates for a probability theory grounded in plausible equiprobability principles, suggesting this offers a more rigorous and less arbitrary foundation. Carnap's work on the logical foundations of probability is mentioned as an example where equiprobability principles can derive specific rules, such as the rule of succession, which is crucial for assessing probabilities of generalizations from observed instances.

The million marble argument and the limits of structure descriptions

Tooley introduces the 'Million Marble Argument' as a significant objection to a probability principle based on 'structure descriptions.' In this thought experiment, an urn contains one million marbles, all but one of which are white. If one marble is drawn and it's white, a structure description approach would suggest the probability of the next marble being white is 2/3 (using the formula n+1 over n+2, where n is the number of white marbles already drawn and the total number of marbles). Tooley's informal survey indicated that most people intuitively assign a probability much closer to 1/2. This suggests that the structure description principle, which focuses on the counts of properties rather than specific identities, may not align with our epistemic judgments about probability, particularly when learning from experience.

The case for state description principles

In contrast to the structure description approach, Tooley favors probability principles based on 'state descriptions.' A state description specifies not only how many individuals have a property but also which specific individuals possess it. Applying this to the marble urn scenario, the state description principle yields a probability of 500,001 out of 1,000,001 for the next marble being white, a result much closer to the intuitive 1/2. While acknowledging that Carnap's arguments seemed to undermine state description principles by suggesting they prevent learning from experience, Tooley believes there are ways to address these objections, making state description principles a more plausible foundation for probabilistic reasoning, including arguments from evil.

Bayesianism and the role of prior probabilities

The Bayesian approach to probability is mentioned as a framework that can be employed within the argument from evil. However, Tooley clarifies that Bayesianism itself relies on underlying equiprobability principles to establish prior probabilities. Some forms of Bayesianism are subjectivist, meaning they are wary of assigning initial probabilities without evidence. Tooley's approach, by contrast, 'beefs up' Bayesianism by providing a mechanism (equiprobability principles) for

Mentioned in This Episode

●Software & Apps

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●Books

●People Referenced

Common Questions

The two main types are Humean-style arguments and probabilistic-style arguments. Evidential arguments, which go back to David Hume, examine the probability of God's existence given the presence of evil in the world.

Topics

Science & Mathematics Philosophy Of Science Philosophy Of Religion Argument From Evil Probabilistic Arguments Equiprobability Principle Inference To The Best Explanation Logical Probability

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People

David Hume

Philosopher whose 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' is referenced for early evidential arguments from evil, proposing that a creator might be perfectly evil, perfectly good, or mixed, and suggesting the absence of forces for good and evil as more probable.

Paul Draper

A contemporary philosopher whose work on the evidential argument from evil is discussed, initially focusing on the hypothesis of indifference and later on contrasting views of whether consciousness or the physical world is prior.

Rudolph Carnap

A philosopher of science whose work on probability is discussed, particularly his argument that accepting the state description principle might lead to an inability to learn from experience, and his supplementation on the logical foundations of probability.

Books

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

A philosophical work by David Hume that contains early arguments concerning the problem of evil, exploring various hypotheses about the nature of a creator in relation to good and evil in the world.

Software & Apps

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

An academic resource where Michael Tooley wrote a comprehensive entry on the problem of evil.

ChatGPT

Mentioned as a tool that gives absurd answers regarding the rule of succession in probability calculations.

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