What is the difference between compatibilism and incompatibilism regarding free will?

Incompatibilists believe determinism and free will cannot coexist, so if determinism is true, we lack free will. Compatibilists, however, argue that free will and determinism can coexist if certain conditions are met, like understanding right from wrong.

Does Richard Swinburne believe intentions cause brain states?

Yes, Swinburne argues that we are agents who intentionally cause actions. He believes that our intentions influence our actions and that there's no definitive evidence to prove that only prior brain events cause brain events.

How do desires and moral beliefs influence our actions according to Swinburne?

Swinburne explains that desires are inclinations to do something, while moral beliefs are seen as truths independent of our belief. Acting on moral beliefs is praiseworthy, but conflict arises when desires clash with moral beliefs, potentially leading to blame.

What is the 'causal closure of the physical' argument against free will?

This argument posits that all physical events are determined by prior physical events, meaning nothing outside the physical world, like mental intentions, can influence it. Swinburne argues this principle is false.

Why does Swinburne believe the causal closure of the physical is false?

He argues it's self-defeating because if the mental doesn't affect the physical, we couldn't rely on memory or testimony, undermining our ability to know anything, including the principle itself.

What does Swinburne mean by 'property dualism'?

Property dualism suggests that mental events are distinct from physical events, but they can still influence each other. This is crucial for his argument that mental intentions can cause physical brain events.

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Can Science Disprove Free Will? | Richard Swinburne

Closer To Truth

People & Blogs6 min read21 min video

Aug 22, 2026|306 views|27|23

Closer to Truth PBS science show STEM education channel Robert Lawrence Kuhn life's big questions deepest questions fundamental questions about reality ideas of existence ultimate reality of the universe vital ideas search for purpose Richard Swinburne

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TL;DR

Science can't disprove free will because the claim that only physical events cause other physical events is self-defeating. If true, we couldn't trust our memories or scientific knowledge.

Key Insights

Moral responsibility and legal systems depend on the concept of free will, as punishment is predicated on individuals being culpable for their actions.

Incompatibilism argues that if determinism (every event is necessitated by prior causes) is true, then free will does not exist, while compatibilism suggests free will is possible even in a determined universe.

Richard Swinburne rejects the 'causal closure of the physical,' the idea that only physical events can cause other physical events, arguing that mental events (like intentions) must be able to influence physical brain states.

Swinburne argues that asserting the causal closure of the physical is self-defeating because it undermines the justification for believing in our own memories and the reports of others, which form the basis of scientific knowledge.

While science might not disprove free will, Swinburne acknowledges that if all mental and physical processes are deterministic, libertarian free will would be absent, but proving such universal correlation would require unobtainable evidence.

The principle of credulity suggests we should believe that things are as they seem, and it appears to us that we are making choices in light of reasons, making it reasonable to believe in free will in the absence of definitive counter-evidence.

The foundational importance of free will for moral responsibility

Philosophers and theologians, particularly Christians, deeply value the concept of free will because it underpins moral responsibility. The ability to choose good over evil, and to be held accountable for wrongdoing, is central to our understanding of guilt, praise, and divine judgment. This notion extends to secular legal systems, which presume that individuals are culpable for their crimes and therefore deserve punishment. Without free will, the justification for punishing criminals, distinguishing between those who have committed offenses and those who might, and the entire basis of a just legal system, would be called into question, potentially shifting focus solely to public safety and reformation rather than desert.

Compatibilism versus incompatibilism in the free will debate

The debate over free will typically branches into two main camps: compatibilism and incompatibilism. Incompatibilists assert that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive; if determinism is true, we lack genuine free will. This view allows for the possibility that determinism is false, thus preserving free will, or that determinism is true, leading to the conclusion that free will is an illusion. Compatibilists, conversely, argue that free will can coexist with determinism. They propose that even if our actions are causally determined, we can still be considered free and morally responsible as long as certain conditions are met. These conditions often involve not being coerced or unduly influenced, such as by severe duress or a lack of understanding of right and wrong. However, incompatibilists like Swinburne find it difficult to accept that the mere absence of external coercion, when actions are still entirely determined by prior states, grants true freedom or responsibility.

The mind's role in causing actions: rejecting causal closure

A significant challenge to free will comes from the principle of the 'causal closure of the physical,' which posits that all physical events have only physical causes. Many scientists and philosophers adopt this view, suggesting that our intentions and choices are merely epiphenomena – byproducts of brain activity that do not themselves cause further physical events. Richard Swinburne vehemently rejects this. He argues that our intentions are not mere passive outcomes of brain states but are active agents that cause bodily movements, leading to actions. He posits that we are agents who intentionally cause actions, and this intentionality is key. For an action to be intentional, we must mean to do it. Therefore, he contends that mental events, specifically our intentions, must have the capacity to influence physical brain events. This view, known as property dualism, holds that mental events are distinct from physical events and can exert causal power over them.

Why the causal closure of the physical is self-defeating

Swinburne presents a compelling argument that the doctrine of the causal closure of the physical is self-defeating. If the mental cannot affect the physical, then our memories, which are stored as traces in the brain from past mental experiences, could not cause us to recall those experiences. This would mean we have no justification for believing our memories. Consequently, if we cannot trust our memories, we cannot justify our beliefs about past observations or reasoning, which are fundamental to scientific knowledge. Science relies on accumulated knowledge, communication of findings (which involves mental events causing physical ones like speech or writing), and our ability to remember and learn. To assert that the mental cannot influence the physical is to undermine the very foundation upon which our knowledge, including the claim of causal closure itself, is built.

The interplay of desires, moral beliefs, and choice

Swinburne elaborates on the internal process of decision-making, influenced by both desires and moral beliefs. He distinguishes between a 'desire' as a mere inclination to do something, and a 'moral belief' as a conviction that an action is right, which possesses independent truth value. When desires and moral beliefs conflict—for example, desiring to lie to protect one's reputation while believing lying is morally wrong—we face a choice. Acting on moral beliefs is praiseworthy, while acting against them due to desire incurs moral guilt. He posits that our moral beliefs are about truths that would hold even if we didn't hold them, whereas a desire is merely an inclination that provides a reason for action only because we have it.

The challenges for science in disproving libertarian free will

While Swinburne argues against the causal closure of the physical, he acknowledges that determinism could still be true if both brain-to-mind and mind-to-brain processes are entirely deterministic. Such a scenario would negate libertarian free will, which he sees as necessary for moral responsibility. However, he believes science faces immense, likely insurmountable, practical challenges in proving this. Demonstrating a universal correlation between specific brain states and subsequent actions would require an impossibly detailed understanding of every individual's unique brain state, desires, and moral beliefs, making it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for science to definitively rule out free will.

The principle of credulity as a basis for believing in free will

In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence against free will, Swinburne appeals to the 'principle of credulity.' This principle suggests that we should believe that things are as they appear to be. Our subjective experience strongly suggests that we are agents who make choices consciously and deliberately, weighing reasons and acting upon them. Since science cannot provide definitive proof to the contrary, and our experience of free choice is so fundamental, Swinburne argues it is reasonable to continue to believe in our capacity for free will.

Mentioned in This Episode

●Organizations

●People Referenced

Free Will: Key Concepts and Arguments

Practical takeaways from this episode

Do This

Believe that we are agents who intentionally cause bodily movements.

Acknowledge that desires and moral beliefs influence our actions.

Act on moral beliefs when they conflict with desires for praiseworthy actions.

Consider moral beliefs as truths independent of our personal belief.

Believe in free will based on the principle of credulity, as it seems we are choosing in light of reasons.

Avoid This

Assume that brain states solely determine actions without agent intention.

Accept the causal closure of the physical as an insurmountable argument against free will.

Deny that past mental experiences can influence present actions and beliefs.

Rely solely on scientific evidence to disprove free will, as such evidence may be unobtainable.

Dismiss the apparent experience of choosing for ourselves.

Common Questions

Free will is vexing because it's central to moral responsibility. If our actions are caused by prior events outside our control, it's hard to see how we can be held accountable for them.

Topics

Neuroscience & the Brain Mindset & Self-Improvement Free-will Mind-Body Problem Moral Responsibility Causal Closure Agent Causation

Mentioned in this video

People

Richard Swinburne

The speaker, a philosopher discussing his approach to free will, arguing for moral responsibility and against the causal closure of the physical.

Organizations

Christianity

Mentioned as a belief system that emphasizes moral responsibility to God, linking good actions to divine reward.

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