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What Is Disrupting GPS Over Europe?

VeritasiumVeritasium
Education6 min read35 min video
Jun 5, 2026|183,940 views|15,663|1,529
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TL;DR

A Russian military satellite may be intentionally jamming GPS signals across Europe, potentially as a test of a new electronic warfare capability.

Key Insights

1

75 days of strong GPS signal disruptions across Europe, stretching from Svalbard to Spain and as far west as Canada, were identified between 2019 and 2024.

2

The disruptions caused a drop in signal-to-noise ratio of roughly a factor of 10, overwhelming navigation signals.

3

Interference events showed a pattern of occurring mostly on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays during European business hours, suggesting human input rather than random failure.

4

Analysis narrowed down the source to a satellite in a high orbit, at least 1,200 km above Earth, potentially in or near the geostationary belt.

5

Raw radio signal data allowed researchers to pinpoint the source to the Russian satellite Cosmos 2546, part of Russia's early missile warning system.

6

The observed signal strength is hundreds of times more powerful than GPS signals, though slightly offset from the GPS frequency, possibly indicating a test phase.

Mysterious, widespread disruptions in GPS signals are detected

In November 2024, Professor Todd Humphre and his student Zack Clemens discovered a pattern of significant GPS signal disruptions across Europe. Analyzing data from 2021, they identified 75 days since 2019 where navigation signals were overwhelmed, causing a drop in signal-to-noise ratio by a factor of 10. These disruptions affected receivers across a vast area, from Svalbard in the north to Spain in the south, and as far west as Canada and east as Poland, suggesting a continental-scale phenomenon with a distinct pattern centered around Poland or Kaliningrad.

Eliminating ground-based and solar interference

Initial hypotheses about ground-based interference, such as those from the heavily militarized Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, were quickly dismissed. Even the highest towers in such locations could only affect signals over hundreds of kilometers, far shorter than the continental distances observed. Solar interference was also ruled out because the events were abrupt, short bursts of 3-5 seconds, unlike the gradual build-up and fade of solar storms. Furthermore, the interference was confined to a narrow 5 MHz band at 1577.5 MHz, specific to GPS frequencies, and concentrated over Europe, unlike solar radio bursts which affect the entire sunlit side of Earth.

The unique way GPS positioning works

To understand the vulnerability of GPS, it's essential to grasp how it functions. Your phone listens to signals from satellites, which contain the satellite's position and the precise time the signal was sent. By measuring the time difference between transmission and arrival, your receiver calculates the distance to the satellite. Triangulating distances from multiple satellites narrows down your position. However, your phone's clock is not atomic-precise, leading to timing errors that significantly impact position. To compensate, GPS systems use at least four satellites: three for position (X, Y, Z) and a fourth to account for the receiver's clock error. Ground stations continuously monitor satellites, updating their positions and providing timing corrections. Even with these corrections, factors like relativity, Earth's rotation, and atmospheric effects introduce errors, which are mitigated by using signals from more satellites. This intricate process allows for accuracy down to a few meters but relies entirely on receiving these weak satellite signals.

Non-random timing suggests human intervention

Further analysis of the disruption data revealed a striking pattern: the events predominantly occurred on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays during typical European business hours. This strongly suggested human involvement, ruling out random satellite failures or natural phenomena. The implication was that someone was likely operating a powerful transmitter, but the exact source remained elusive due to the difficulty of pinpointing a space-based transmitter from ground observations. The curvature of the Earth and the vast distances involved complicate signal strength analysis, requiring knowledge of the transmitter's power, beam direction, and receiver antenna characteristics.

Narrowing the search to satellites

Given that ground-based sources were impossible and solar interference excluded, the only plausible explanation was a satellite. Researchers used the constraint that the source must be above the horizon for affected stations simultaneously. This eliminated over 98% of orbiting satellites, leaving approximately 200 possibilities. Further filtering by considering multiple events over different days narrowed the list to 14 potential 'suspect' satellites, many of which were in or near geostationary orbits, allowing a single satellite to cover a large portion of Earth. An Algerian satellite was initially a strong candidate due to its public documentation of a transmitter in the relevant frequency band, but closer examination revealed it was also a victim of the interference, not the source.

The challenge of raw data and a community effort

The investigation stalled for about four months due to unknown factors like signal intensity and beam patterns of the remaining 13 candidate satellites. A fundamental challenge was the assumption of a single satellite source, which, if broken, would drastically expand the search. The existing data from standard GNSS receivers lacked the temporal resolution to precisely time the short interference bursts and compare them across stations. To overcome this, researchers began designing specialized receivers for high-resolution data capture. In September 2025, they presented their findings publicly, sparking a community effort. Despite ambitious tracking plans by institutions like the German Aerospace Center, no immediate breakthroughs occurred. However, an email containing raw radio signal data from two stations in Amsterdam and Trondheim finally provided the crucial evidence needed.

Pinpointing the source with raw signal analysis

The raw radio signal data, sampled millions of times per second, allowed researchers to precisely align interference events recorded at different locations. By measuring the tiny difference in arrival times at Trondheim and Amsterdam (approximately 139 microseconds earlier at Trondheim), they could define a 'hyperboloid' curve in space representing all possible locations of the signal source. This constraint, with an error margin of only 5 meters, was then used to test every satellite's orbit against the predicted arrival times. After rigorous testing, one satellite, the Russian Cosmos 2546, perfectly matched the data, aligning with the hyperboloid data to within 200 meters. This satellite is part of Russia's early missile warning system and operates in a highly elliptical orbit that provides coverage over the northern hemisphere.

Implications of potential military electronic warfare

While Cosmos 2546's launch date (May 2020) could not explain the 2019 events, its constellation of six satellites in a constellation part of Russia's missile detection system, the 'Golden Dome,' provides broad coverage. The broadcast power is hundreds of times greater than GPS signals, though slightly offset in frequency. Professor Humphre theorizes this could be a test phase, with the jamming signal later tuned directly onto the GPS band for maximum damage. The discovery of a second interference burst at a lower frequency, overlapping with China's BeiDou system, further suggests intentional testing. This represents a significant escalation in electronic warfare, with the potential to disrupt aviation, shipping, financial systems, and countless other technologies dependent on GNSS. Alternative theories suggest these might be covert communication signals, but whether tests or communications, the events highlight the vulnerability of current navigation systems and a need for more resilient, multi-layered architectures, including terrestrial and fiber-based solutions, to mitigate future disruptions.

Common Questions

Research suggests the disruptions, characterized by a sudden drop in signal-to-noise ratio, were caused by a Russian satellite, Cosmos 2546, part of its missile warning system. The interference was too widespread and specific to be natural phenomena like solar storms.

Topics

Mentioned in this video

Locations
Europe

The continent where the GPS signal disruptions were observed to be most concentrated.

Poland

A region in Eastern Europe noted as a potential 'blast center' for the GPS interference.

Königsberg

A Russian exclave mentioned as a possible source of interference due to its militarized status and location.

International Space Station

Used as a reference point for altitude to indicate the high elevation required for the source of the GPS disruptions.

Paris

Used as an example city to illustrate the complexities of calculating precise location using GPS, including Earth's rotation and atmospheric effects.

Algeria

The country operating a satellite that was initially considered a strong candidate for causing GPS interference due to its documented transmitter capabilities.

Greenland

A location where GPS receivers were affected by the disruptions, used to help constrain the possible source altitude.

Amsterdam

A location in the Netherlands with a GNSS receiver that provided crucial raw data for pinpointing the source of the interference.

Trondheim

A location in Norway with a GNSS receiver that provided crucial raw data for pinpointing the source of the interference.

Russia

The country operating Cosmos 2546 and its associated missile warning system, suspected of being behind the GPS disruptions.

South Korea

A country mentioned as developing backup navigation networks that do not rely solely on satellite signals.

China

A country mentioned as developing backup navigation networks and operating the BeiDou navigation system.

United Kingdom

A country mentioned as developing backup navigation networks that do not rely solely on satellite signals.

United States

The country that gifted GPS to the world and remains highly dependent on satellite navigation systems.

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