What Are the Laws of Nature? | Michael Tooley

A key objection to David Lewis's theory is that the balance between 'strength' and 'simplicity' in generalizations is subjective, making laws of nature not fully objective. Additionally, the theory struggles with cases where laws might exist without any actual instances.

The speaker argues yes, using hypothetical scenarios like an animal named Sunny that never sees a purple flower, but a law linking light properties to neural circuitry could still exist. This challenges views that define laws solely by observed regularities.

Some scientists, like Murray Gell-Mann, prefer 'regularities' due to a preference for a robustly empirical way of thinking about reality. However, the speaker finds this epistemologically unsatisfactory, as observed regularities alone don't logically guarantee universal truths.

This theory, defended by the speaker, Fred Dretzsky, and David Armstrong, posits that laws of nature are relations between properties (universals), existing independently of specific events. Observing instances confirms these underlying relational properties.

The discussion touches on this through the 'Mary argument,' suggesting that qualia (subjective experiences) might represent aspects of reality not fully captured by physics alone. This raises questions about strong emergence and whether consciousness has laws irreducible to physics.

Epiphenomenalism suggests that conscious experiences (qualia) are byproducts of physical processes but do not themselves have causal power over the physical world, much like foam on a wave is a result of but doesn't influence the wave itself. The speaker confesses to holding this view.

As an atheist, the speaker doesn't invoke a divine creator. While not fully explored, possibilities discussed include emergence, a multiverse scenario where laws are a result of 'shuffling the deck,' or inherent, necessary aspects of reality.