Why do people cling to the idea of free will, even when presented with scientific arguments?

The primary reason seems to be intuition; it 'just feels like' we are exercising free will in the moment of decision. Compatibilists like Dan Dennett also argue that believing in free will is socially and psychologically beneficial, and directly addressing its absence can be destabilizing.

How does complexity theory and emergence relate to the debate on free will?

Some argue that free will emerges from complex systems like the brain, similar to how 'wetness' emerges from water molecules. However, Sapolsky argues this relies on a flawed notion of 'downward causality,' where the emergent property would change the fundamental components in a way that doesn't happen.

What is 'downward causation' and why is it problematic for free will?

Downward causation suggests higher-level emergent properties can influence the behavior of lower-level components. Sapolsky argues that while abstract thoughts can influence physiology (e.g., stress response), they don't fundamentally change the 'rules' of the constituent parts (like neurons), thus not providing space for free will.

If there's no free will, what makes us distinctly human or capable of civilization?

Even without free will, we retain critical distinctions like voluntary vs. involuntary behavior, and the complex neural underpinnings of empathy, theory of mind, and finding optimal balances in stress and social interaction contribute to our humanness and the capacity for civilization.

How do genes and environment determine our behavior if not through free will?

Our behavior is determined by our genes, the bodies and brains built on that genetic information, and everything the environment has causally done to that system from conception onward – including prenatal development and every interaction thereafter.

Does epigenetics offer an escape route from determinism regarding free will?

No, epigenetics provides a mechanism for how environmental factors influence gene expression, especially in early life and across generations. It explains how upbringing affects adult outcomes but doesn't grant conscious control over these epigenetic changes or retroactively reverse them.

Does unpredictability in our behavior mean we have free will?

Unpredictability does not equate to free will. Even fully determined systems can be complex and unpredictable (like weather). If behavior is influenced by randomness (e.g., quantum indeterminacy), that still doesn't confer responsibility, as it's like rolling dice.

Key Moments

We Really Don’t Have Free Will?: A Conversation with Robert M. Sapolsky (Episode #360)

Sam Harris

Science & Technology4 min read40 min video

Mar 28, 2024|113,298 views|2,386|895

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Key Moments

TL;DR

Robert Sapolsky argues against free will, stating our actions are determined by biology and environment, not conscious choice. He refutes emergent properties and downward causation as justifications for free will.

Key Insights

The core argument against free will is that our actions are determined by a causal chain from our genes to our environment, leaving no room for conscious, uncaused choice.

Compatibilist definitions of free will, like that of Dan Dennett, are seen as changing the subject by redefining free will to align with determinism, rather than addressing the intuitive sense of libertarian free will.

Emergence and downward causation are not valid arguments for free will, as emergent properties do not alter the fundamental causal behaviors of the simpler constituent parts.

Our intuitive feeling of free will, while powerful, is not evidence for its existence and is often challenged by the scientific understanding of biological and environmental influences.

Concepts like epigenetics explain how environmental factors influence gene expression, reinforcing the deterministic view rather than providing an alibi for free will.

Unpredictability in behavior does not equate to free will; it often stems from the complexity of deterministic systems or true randomness, neither of which grants conscious agency.

DEFINING FREE WILL AND THE CONFLICT WITH DETERMINISM

Robert Sapolsky defines free will as the ability to have acted otherwise, meaning an action was not predetermined by prior causes. This 'libertarian free will' is incompatible with a deterministic universe where every event, including human behavior, is the inevitable outcome of antecedent conditions. Sapolsky asserts that true free will would require actions to be free from history, a state he argues is impossible given our biological and environmental makeup. He presents a rigorous definition that creates a fundamental conflict with scientific determinism.

THE LIMITATIONS OF INTUITION AND COMPATIBILIST ARGUMENTS

A primary challenge Sapolsky faces is the strong subjective intuition of free will. People feel they consciously choose their actions, separate from biological processes. He contends this feeling is misleading and does not constitute evidence for free will. Sapolsky also critiques compatibilist philosophers like Daniel Dennett, arguing they redefine free will to align with determinism, effectively changing the topic rather than addressing the core concept of uncaused agency, likening it to claiming Atlantis is real by pointing to Sicily.

EMERGENCE AND DOWNWARD CAUSATION: NO LOOPHOLE FOR FREE WILL

Sapolsky dismisses the idea that free will can emerge from complex systems or through 'downward causation.' While complex systems like brains exhibit novel properties not present in their individual components, these emergent properties do not grant the components themselves new causal powers or freedom. A complex society of ants doesn't make individual ants magically smarter; similarly, a complex brain doesn't allow neurons to act outside their fundamental deterministic rules. Downward causation, where higher-level thoughts influence lower-level physiology, is also explained as a cascade of existing physical processes, not a change in the nature of the building blocks.

THE DETERMINISTIC ROLE OF GENETICS AND ENVIRONMENT

Our actions, Sapolsky argues, are a product of our genes and the cumulative impact of environmental influences from conception onwards. This includes everything from prenatal conditions to every interaction and experience throughout life. Even abstract concepts or ideas, when influencing our behavior, are ultimately represented by neural states, which are themselves subject to these causal chains. He even points out that if one believes in a soul, the freedom to choose one's soul or genetic makeup is also absent.

EVIDENCE FROM EPIGENETICS AND UNPREDICTABILITY

Epigenetics, which describes how environmental factors can alter gene expression without changing DNA sequence, is presented not as an escape from determinism but as a mechanism that further explains how early life experiences shape us. It provides a pathway for understanding multigenerational effects of trauma, reinforcing the pervasive influence of our history. Similarly, unpredictability in human behavior does not support free will; it usually arises from extreme system complexity, making precise prediction impossible, or from genuine randomness, neither of which grants agency.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MORALITY, PUNISHMENT, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES

Accepting the absence of free will has profound implications, particularly for ethics and justice. Sapolsky suggests that our retributive impulses to punish wrongdoers, driven by a belief in ultimate responsibility, may need re-evaluation. While this view can be destabilizing, he implies that understanding the determined nature of behavior could lead to more compassionate and effective approaches to crime and societal organization. The intuitive satisfaction of punishing those perceived as 'bad' is examined as a psychological phenomenon rather than a moral imperative.

Mentioned in This Episode

●Organizations

●Books

●Concepts

●People Referenced

Common Questions

Sapolsky defines free will as the ability of a neuron, brain, or person to perform an action such that the exact same action would not have occurred if the neuron's history were different. Essentially, it's acting free of history.

Topics

Neuroscience & the Brain Mindset & Self-Improvement Science & Mathematics Criminal Justice

Mentioned in this video

Concepts

Compatibilism

A philosophical stance on free will that the speakers believe changes the topic, using an analogy of defining Atlantis as Sicily.

Atlantis

Used as an analogy by Sam Harris to explain how compatibilists like Dan Dennett might redefine terms to fit their arguments, akin to saying Atlantis is Sicily.

libertarian free will

The notion that one could have done otherwise if one rewound time, which is considered indefensible by the speakers.

People

Robert Sapolsky

Author of 'Behavior' and 'Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will,' and a professor at Stanford University. He has accepted the implications of science on the topic of free will.

Ted Bundy

Used as an extreme example of a person with a specific soul or set of dispositions, contrasting with the idea that one could have had a different 'soul' and thus a different life trajectory.

Media

Bambi

Mentioned as a childhood trauma scenario involving the death of a mother to illustrate how abstract concepts or memories can trigger strong physiological responses.

Organizations

MacArthur Foundation

Awarded Robert Sapolsky a 'genius grant'.

Books

Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will

Robert Sapolsky's recent book arguing against the concept of free will based on scientific evidence.

Behave

A non-fiction work by Robert Sapolsky about primates.

Locations

New York City

Used as a hypothetical scenario for a catastrophic event (nuclear bomb) to illustrate the powerful psychological and physiological impact of information, even if it's just 'words'.